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While partisan identity has long been the strongest predictor of American political behavior,
recent research indicates that partisan political identity is increasingly taking on a social di-
mension, resulting in an in-group/out-group mentality that is comparable in strength to racial
identity (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). This social polarization along partisan lines has caused
pundits and academics alike to express concern that American politics has entered a new era of
partisan tribalism. Such concerns are well-founded—a large body of literature has documented
that social identity affects distributional preferences and political decisions (Charness, Rigotti
and Rustichini, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Shayo, 2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010) and directly im-
pacts voting behavior by creating an expressive preference (or even norm) to vote for in-group
candidates (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Bassi, Morton and Williams, 2011). In ad-
dition to an expressive effect, however, social polarization—defined as the existence of strong
partisan identities—may also have an instrumental impact on voters’ actions by influencing
their beliefs regarding the partisan bias that political representatives will display once in office.
This instrumental effect can be clearly illustrated using the principal-agent model of political
representation: Political representatives are often tasked with choosing between different policies
that result in different distributions of voter payoffs. When facing such a choice, they could
choose policies that are in the best interest of the general population, or policies that favor a
particular group. Accordingly, in an environment where political representatives cannot commit
to decisions prior to being elected, voters must anticipate how prospective representatives will
choose between different policies before deciding whom to vote for; i.e. voters form beliefs
over whether candidates will pursue a utilitarian objective, or instead choose policy to advance
their identity group’s specific interests. In such a situation, identity may play an important
instrumental role in the voter’s decision. Simply put, if a candidate’s distributional preferences
depend on their identity, e.g if candidates’ distributional preferences are biased towards in-group
voters, then identity will provide voters with an informative signal of that candidate’s ex post
policy choices, and voters will account for this in their voting decisions.
In this paper, we explore this instrumental impact of social polarization on partisan vot-
ing in a principal-agent model of political representation. First, we develop a formal theory
that incorporates the group identity model of Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007) into a
simple principal-agent model of elections. In particular, we characterize the trade-off voters
face between selecting political representatives based on identity and selecting based on quality
(valence). Our framework focuses on detailing the instrumental impact of identity on voter
behavior, and also informs our experimental strategy for distinguishing between the expressive
and instrumental impact.1 Importantly, our model shows that the instrumental impact of so-
cial polarization depends on the underlying degree of polarization in voters’ policy preference.
Intuitively, when there is little difference between the policy preferences of the different identity
1 The existing literature describes, but does not experimentally separate cleanly, the expressive impact of social
polarization on partisan voting and partisanship-guided political participation as driven by expressive motivations
through rising partisan loyalty or increased concern for in-group status and welfare, and instrumental motivations
to support policies and ideologies shared by those voters who identify with the same party (Hamlin and Jennings,
2011; Mason, 2015; Huddy, Mason and Aarøe, 2015).
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groups, then there is little scope for representatives to bias policy in favor of in-group voters.
Therefore, candidates will choose centrist policies when voters all have similar policy prefer-
ences, even when social polarization is high. Conversely, when policy preferences are strongly
polarized and correlated with identity, then social polarization will lead representatives to se-
lect policies that favor in-group voters. If voters anticipate this interaction between social and
policy polarization, then they will disproportionately vote for in-group candidates when policy
polarization is high.
To test the theoretical predictions, we conduct a laboratory experiment. Our findings are
highly consistent with the theory: Candidates consistently choose policy that is biased towards
their partisan in-group, and voters display a willingness to vote for in-group candidates even
when the out-group candidate has a higher valence. Importantly, we also find that the in-group
bias of both candidates and voters is increasing in the degree of polarization in policy preference.
This finding confirms that partisan in-group voting is more than an expressive phenomenon.
Instead, the fact that voters respond to higher polarization of policy preferences indicates that
they anticipate the increased bias of candidates’ ex-post policy choices, and respond by voting
in an increasingly partisan manner.
Our approach also allows us to measure the level of instrumental partisan voting. Since the
expressive motive to vote for the in-group candidate does not increase with higher polarization
of policy preferences, we can measure the instrumental impact of identity by comparing the
degree of partisan voting when policy polarization is low to the degree of partisan voting when
policy polarization is high. Using this approach, we find that when policy choice is equivalent to
a zero-sum game between voters of the two partisan groups, then fifty-five percent of partisan,
in-group voting can be attributed to the instrumental impact of social identity.
These findings have important implications regarding the impact of increasing social po-
larization on the electoral process: in contrast to existing studies, we show that the impact
of social polarization in our setting is unambiguously socially harmful since it leads to policies
that diverge from the social optimum and shifts the emphasis of political selection from selection
based on quality to selection based on partisan identity.
Our theoretical framework considers voters who choose between two candidates via majority
rule. Each candidate is characterized by membership in one of two identity-groups, and by a
valence term that functions as a universal public good. Additionally, conditional on being
elected, the candidate makes an ex post policy choice in a three-point policy space (left, center,
right). Since candidates only receive benefits from holding office, their choice of policy depends
only on their preferences over voters’ payoffs: candidates can choose a centrist policy to maximize
aggregate payoffs, or an extreme policy to favor a particular partisan group. Voters’ payoffs
are a function of both the valence of the winning candidate and the policy that the candidate
sets when in office. Importantly, voters’ policy preferences are partisan, in the sense that
voters’ group identities are correlated with the location of their ideal point in the policy space.
Therefore, while all voters prefer a candidate with higher valence ceteris paribus, instrumentally,
they will favor the co-partisan candidate to the extent that they expect candidates to select a
partisan policy.
Our study also highlights the problem of separately identifying the expressive and instru-
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mental impact of identity: if we empirically observe partisan voting, this could be due to either
the expressive effect of identity as identified in Bassi, Morton and Williams (2011), the instru-
mental effect that we highlight in this paper, or a combination of the two. Therefore, to identify
the instrumental link we rely on our models prediction that the degree to which social polariza-
tion influences voting behavior is a function of the magnitude of polarization in voters’ policy
preferences. Intuitively, when policy preferences are homogeneous, then voters will expect the
candidates to adopt a centrist policy if elected and hence have a dominant instrumental incentive
to vote for the higher-valence candidate. As policy preferences become more polarized, how-
ever, voters will expect candidates to take partisan policy positions to cater to the interests of
their in-group, in which case partisan identity becomes a more important factor when selecting
between the candidates. Again, since expressive motives to vote for the co-partisan candidate
are not conditional on the underlying degree of polarization in voters’ policy preferences,2 the
prediction of a positive correlation between policy polarization and partisan voting provides a
clear test of the instrumental effect of social polarization.
While our model is a simplified setting, it captures important features of political compe-
tition that are affected by social identity and social polarization. Importantly, ex post policy
discretion implies that voters face uncertainty regarding which policy the candidates will select
once in office. Absent identity cues, voters expect all candidates to maximize aggregate utility
and choose a centrist policy. In a setting with identity divisions, however, the group identity
model predicts that candidates will favor policy positions that disproportionately benefit the
in-group. This implies that voters will interpret identity cues as a signal that the co-partisan
candidate will select policies that are consistent with the political values and norms of the group,
and hence rationally respond to these cues by voting in a partisan manner.
In the experiment, both candidates and voters belong to one of two identity-groups. We
induce social polarization either by a standard minimal-group intervention or by appealing to a
pre-existing identity, both of which have been shown to result in group conflict and an in-group
preference in a controlled experiment (Tajfel and Billig, 1974; Goette, Huffman and Meier, 2006;
Chen and Li, 2009; Landa and Duell, 2015).3 Additionally, identity groups correspond to voters’
ideal points in the three-point policy space; specifically, we precisely control the degree of policy
preference polarization by changing the degree of correlation between group membership and
ideal policy points: in the case of no policy polarization, all voters have ideal points at the
center; in the case of full polarization in voters’ policy preference, one group is located at the
left extreme while the other is at the right extreme.
Our experiment robustly confirms an instrumental impact of social polarization on vot-
ing behavior: as the degree of correlation between group identity and extreme ideal policy
preference increases, voters increasingly vote for their co-partisan candidate. The positive rela-
2Another condition is required for identifying the instrumental impact; namely, the probability of being
pivotal must be non-decreasing in degree of polarization of policy preferences. We show that this condition is
satisfied in a robustness check introduced after our main analysis of the experimental results.
3 Throughout this paper we refer to group identity and social identity interchangeably. We acknowledge that
the former only requires individuals subjective awareness of group membership but may not rise to the level of
being a social identity while the latter goes beyond awareness of membership and demands the individual to
attach value and emotional significance to the membership (Tajfel, 1981).
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tionship between policy polarization and partisan voting allows us to conclude that in a world
where identities are correlated with political preferences, in-group voting is more than just an
expressive phenomena—the strategic response in voting behavior to the underlying degree of
policy polarization shows that voters anticipate candidates’ bias in policy choices, and respond
to changes in the fundamental elements of the political competition (i.e. the degree of policy
polarization) by adjusting their voting behavior to account for the degree of in-group favoritism
displayed by the candidates.
Our paper makes several important contributions to existing literatures. Generally, we build
on the pioneering work by Turner and Brown (1978) studying the effect of minimal groups on
behavior, and the incorporation of social and group identity into formal models of choice by
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007). Most existing work on
social identity in experimental economics has considered the direct effect of group membership
on distributional preferences and cooperation (for example, Eckel and Grossman, 2005, Goette,
Huffman and Meier, 2006, and Chen and Li, 2009). In contrast, we focus on the impact of
group membership on the beliefs subjects hold about the choices made by others. We find that
subjects rationally anticipate the impact of group membership on distributional preferences,
and exhibit a willingness to pay to delegate agency to an in-group member.
In the realm of collective choice, Klor and Shayo (2010) and Bassi, Morton and Williams
(2011) show that group identity influences subjects’ voting behavior (also related, Tyran, 2004
shows that social norms may influence voting behavior). However, these papers consider vot-
ing over fixed policy alternatives—in contrast, we consider the impact of social identity in a
principle-agent model of voting. This allows for an instrumental impact of social identity, as
social identity impacts voter behavior by influencing their beliefs regarding the ex post actions
of political representatives.
Lastly, within political science a large, influential literature has emerged studying the impact
of partisan social identities on political behavior (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Iyengar
and Westwood, 2015; Huddy, Mason and Aarøe, 2015; Mason, 2015; Huddy, Bankert and Davies,
2018). This literature, however, has been largely silent on the impact of social polarization on
welfare. In this paper, we formally model the impact of social polarization of voting behavior
in a principle-agent model of political behavior and predict that social polarization will have
a strictly negative impact on welfare. Additionally, in an experimental test we confirm the
predictions of the theory and show that existing social polarization leads to a situation in which
political representatives take policy decisions that diverge from the social optimum, and voters
select candidates with lower average quality.
2 A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Social Identity
Here we introduce a simple formal structure that reflects our experimental design, and allows
us to detail identity-contingent (partisan) political behavior when the electorate is socially
polarized. While the model informs our experimental strategy for separately identifying the
expressive and instrumental impact of social polarization on partisan voting, readers may also
skip straight to Section 2.4 for an overview of the theoretical findings.
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For clarity, we begin with an overview of the basic structure of the model before presenting
the model in detail: Voters and candidates belong to one of two identity groups. Voters vote for
one of two candidates, who belong to different identity groups and have individual valence terms
that are publicly observable. The winning candidate then implements a policy that results in a
distribution of payoffs that may be skewed towards one of the two identity groups.
Importantly, candidates chose policy ex post and do not receive policy payoffs. That is,
candidates’ monetary payoffs do not depend on their choice of policy; however, candidates’
have preferences over the distribution of voters’ policy payoffs. Accordingly, they implement
the policy that maximizes their distributional preferences over voter payoffs. We consider the
predictions of the model given two different assumptions regarding the candidates’ distribu-
tional preferences: in the Benchmark model, candidates choose policy to maximize aggregate
welfare; and in the Identity model, candidates’ distributional preferences are skewed towards
their respective in-group.
Voters only value their own payoffs and vote for the candidate that will maximize their
individual payoffs.4 Therefore, as we will establish below, voters preferences over the candidates
will depend on the candidates’ relative valence, the degree to which the candidates’ distributional
preferences are biased toward their in-group, and the degree of polarization between voters’
policy preferences, as the latter will also influence the policy chosen the winning candidate.
Agents: There are n agents, denoted by the index set N = {1, ..., n}, with n even and greater
than four. Agents either belong to (identity) group A or group B. Take Ii ∈ {A,B} to be
the identity group of agent i. Abusing notation, we will define group membership from the
perspective of agent i when convenient; that is, i is a member of the in-group, denoted by set
I = {j|j ∈ A if i ∈ A else j ∈ B}, while all other agents, j, are either in I or the out-group,
denoted by set I− = N\I. Each identity group has an equal number of agents (|A| = |B|).
Actions and Payoffs: One agent in each group is a candidate; we denote these individuals
by cA and cB. In addition to group membership, each candidate is endowed with a valence term
denoted by αA and αB. After the election, the winning candidate implements a vector of policy
choices, p = (pl, pm, pr), over an ordered three-point policy space {l,m, r}. Each policy choice,
represented by pk for k ∈ {l,m, r}, consists of a value between zero and one (pk ∈ [0, 1]) and
available policy choices are constrained to the set of p that satisfy pl + pm + pr ≤ 1.
Agents who are not candidates are voters and, after observing the candidates’ group mem-
bership and valence, submit a vote, vi, for c
A or cB (no abstention). The winner is chosen by
majority rule with a random tie-breaking rule (50/50), and the winner affects voters’ payoffs
through the following two channels:
1. [Policy] voter i’s payoffs are a function of the policy choice of the winning candidate, pw,
and the voter’s ideal point pi ∈ {l,m, r}.
2. [Valence] voter i’s payoffs are strictly increasing in the winning candidate’s valence, αw.
4We do not include expressive payoffs in the model, and refer interested readers to Duell and Valasek (2018)
for a version of the paper that explicitly models expressive payoffs.
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Figure 1: Payoffs as a function of the voters’ ideal point (payoffs for each ideal point are listed
within the circle) when the winning candidate allocates all policy to the middle point (left
figure), and allocates all policy to the left point (right figure).
Formally, voter payoffs are as follows:
xvi = α
w + v(pw, pi), (1)
where pi is the ideal point of voter i.
Policy payoffs are analogous to a simple linear loss function of the ideal point and the
amount allocated to each pk; voters receive 1 unit of payoff for every unit of pk placed at their
ideal point, and 1/2 units of payoff for every unit of pk placed at a point next to their ideal







pk if k = pi,
1
2pk if k, pi contiguous,
0 if k, pi non-contiguous.
Consistent with our motivation, we are concerned with the case where policy is partisan,
in the sense that policy preferences are correlated with identity. For simplicity, we consider
the case in which policy preferences are stochastic: voters’ ideal points are unknown prior to
the election, but the distribution from which ideal points are drawn is common knowledge.
Formally, for voter i ∈ A, pi is drawn from {l,m} and for i ∈ B, pi is drawn from {m, r}.
Additionally:
Pr(pi = l|i ∈ A) = Pr(pi = r|i ∈ B) = q. (3)
This structure implies that each voter in group A (B) has the same expected policy position
(ex ante symmetry). The assumption of stochastic policy preferences is not substantive with
respect to the formal model; however, it simplifies the experimental analysis substantially, since
group membership correlates perfectly with expected policy preferences. Moreover, q provides
a measure of the polarization of voters’ policy preferences, where q = 1 corresponds to perfect
polarization in policy preferences.
Candidates, on the other hand, are purely office motivated and only receive payoffs based
on whether they win the election. Candidates receive payoffs xi = x
w if they win the election
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and xi = x
l if they lose the election, where xl < xw; i.e.:
xci =
{
xw if i wins election,
xl if i loses election.
Importantly, to isolate the channel of distributional preferences and candidate identity on voters’
decisions, we assume that candidates do not receive policy payoffs. The qualitative predictions
of the model would be similar if candidates received policy payoffs in addition to being biased
towards in-group members; i.e. our main result that partisan voting increases with policy polar-
ization (q) is robust to the assumption of candidates with policy preferences. However, in this
case, is would be difficult to empirically separate between the impact of the candidates’ identity
and the impact of the candidates’ policy preferences on voters’ voting decision. Therefore, by
considering the case where candidates do not receive policy payoffs, we are able to directly
identify the impact of identity.
Preferences: Voters’ preferences are represented by a utility function that is linear in own
payoffs:
uv(xi) = xi.
Candidates, on the other hand, have social preferences over the distribution of payoffs. In
particular, since in our setting candidates take policy decisions before citizens’ ideal points are
revealed, we assume that candidates have distributional preferences over ex ante payoffs. This
is consistent with observed behavior in previous laboratory experiment; quoting Andreoni et al.,
2018, “the most common behavioral pattern is for subjects to select the ex ante fair alternative
ex ante . . . ” Take E[xi] to be the expected payoffs of voter i given the implemented policy, p
w:
E[xi] = Epi [xi|pw, Ii]
Candidates’ preferences are represented by the following utility function:




I represents the set of expected payoffs of voters in group I and g(E[xi]
I ,E[xi]
I−)
represents the candidate’s distributional preferences.
We make the assumption that voters only value own payoffs and that only candidates have
distributional preferences to illustrate the qualitative predictions of the model as simply as
possible—in the experiment subjects will take the role of both candidates and voters, and it
therefore may be more natural to assume that both voters and candidates value own payoffs
and have preferences over the distribution of payoffs. E.g.:
u({xi}) = xi + δg(E[xi]I ,E[xi]I
−
), (4)
with δ > 0.
However, the qualitative predictions of the model are unchanged if both voters’ and candi-
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dates’ preferences are represented by the same utility function as long as δ is not overly large:
voters will still consider their own expected payoffs when choosing which candidate to vote
for, and since candidates do not receive policy payoffs they will choose pw to maximize their
distributional preferences regardless of the size of δ.
We consider the predictions of the model under two models of distributional preferences:
the Benchmark model where candidates choose policy to maximize aggregate welfare, and the
Identity model where candidates’ distributional preferences are skewed towards their respective
in-group. In both models, we assume that distributional utility is a weakly concave function
of others’ expected payoffs to allow for fairness considerations (similar to the model of Cox,
Friedman and Gjerstad, 2007 that allows for concavity in inequality aversion), in addition to
in-group bias.
Benchmark Model: Given that our aim is to test the impact of group identity and social
polarization, we must also define an appropriate benchmark for comparison. A natural candidate
for distributional preferences is social efficiency: as highlighted in Charness and Rabin (2002),
efficiency concerns can explain many experimental data. Therefore, to generate predictions
regarding the behavior of candidates and voters in a world without social polarization, we also









where m ∈ [1,∞)—we use this family of utility functions to represent distributional preferences
since it represents a broad range of strictly increasing and concave functions while also being
tractable within the context of our model.5
Identity Model: Following the literature on minimal groups in social psychology, Charness,
Rigotti and Rustichini (2007); Chen and Li (2009); Goette, Huffman and Meier (2012) document
that even minimal group frames can significantly skew distributional preferences to favor payoffs
for in-group members. As in Chen and Li, we formalize the group identity model by allowing














where λ ∈ [0.5, 1] is a measure of the degree of social polarization, and m ∈ [1,∞) again.
In what follows, we will characterize the predictions under both the Identity and Benchmark
(efficiency) models.
Timing: The timing of the game is as follows
1. Candidates cA, cB are drawn and their abilities, {αA, αB}, are publicly revealed.
2. Voters simultaneously submit votes, vi, for c
A or cB.
5As we detail in the Appendix in the proof of Proposition 1 (introduced below), this family of utility functions
allows us to derive a closed-form solution for E[xi] given the best reply of the winning candidate—other utility
functions do not yield a closed-form solution, which renders part of our analysis intractable.
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3. The winning candidate (by simple majority) chooses pw.
4. Voter policy preferences, pi, are drawn and payoffs, {xi}, realized.
Equilibrium and Welfare: The equilibrium concept is SPNE.6 That is, an equilibrium,
{v; pA,pB}, maximizes the candidates’ distributional preferences and, given {αA, αB} and
{pA,pB}, vi maximizes Epi [uv(xi)|αw,pw] for each i. We impose the selection criteria that,
when they are indifferent, candidates choose a centrist policy and voters vote for their co-
partisan candidate; these assumptions are for convenience only, and are not substantive. We
consider a social efficiency benchmark mirroring the candidates’ distributional preferences: i.e.





We begin by characterizing the outcome that maximizes social efficiency.
Lemma 1 (Efficiency)
Social efficiency is maximized when candidates choose centrist policies, pA = pB = {0, 1, 0}, and
all voters vote for the highest-valence candidate, vi = c
j for all voters i if and only if αj ≥ αj′
for j, j′ ∈ {A,B}.
First, note that a centrist policy maximizes aggregate expected monetary payoffs for any q, since
a unit of policy allocated to the partisan extreme increases the expected payoffs of the in-group
by q− 1/2, but decreases the expected payoffs of the out-group by 1/2 ≥ q− 1/2. Second, since
a centrist policy results in an equal distribution of expected payoff, a centrist policy results
in strictly higher social efficiency for all m > 1 (and weakly higher for m = 1). Lastly, given
that both candidates choose the same policy, efficiency is maximized by selecting the candidate
with the highest valence (social efficiency is always neutral with respect to candidate payoffs).
Formal proofs of all results can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Candidates’ policy choices:
Following backward induction, we begin with the candidates choice of policy, {pA,pB}. Since
candidates choose policy after they are elected, the chosen policy has no direct or indirect impact
on the candidates’ probability of winning the election. Moreover, since candidates do not have
policy preferences, the winning candidate will choose pw to maximize their preferences of the
distribution of voters’ payoffs.
The following propositions partially characterize the equilibrium choices of {pA,pB} under
the Benchmark and Identity models.
Lemma 2 (Policy choices: Benchmark model)
If agents’ distributional preferences are characterized by efficiency then both candidates will
choose centrist policies in equilibrium, pA = pB = {0, 1, 0}.
Note that Lemma 2 follows directly from Lemma 1.
6While pi is unknown to agents, the game is equivalent to a game of complete information since agents’
maximize expected payoffs and pi is not drawn until the final stage of the game.
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Lemma 3 (Policy choices: Identity model)
If agents’ distributional preferences are characterized by group identity, then both candidates
choose policies that are weakly asymmetric, in the sense that pl ≥ pr for pA and pl ≤ pr for pB.
Lemma 3 stems from the inter-group conflict over the partisan policy space: Under the group
identity model, candidates put a higher weight on the payoffs of their group members, and hence
will take policy decisions that favor the partisan position of their group. That is, while under
the Benchmark model the candidate’s group identity is irrelevant and the only distinguishing
characteristic is their relative valence, under the Identity model group identity is an important
predictor of the decisions the candidates will take when in office.
The next result details the comparative statics of the candidates’ policy choices in the
Identity model, and will be key to our strategy for identifying the instrumental impact of social
polarization. However, instead of detailing the specific policy choices of the candidates, it will
be more helpful to characterize the expected policy payoffs of the voters given the equilibrium
policies {pA,pB}. Accordingly, we define ∆x as the difference in expected policy payoffs between
the two candidates for a voter with group identity I:
∆x = E[xi|pI ]− E[xi|pI
−
]
Note that ∆x is well-defined since the equilibrium policies of the candidates are uniquely defined
given λ and q.
This definition allows us to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Comparative statics of the Identity model)
(i) For λ = 0.5, ∆x = 0 for all q.
(ii) For λ > 0.5, ∆x ≥ 0:
1. ∆x is increasing in the degree of policy polarization.
2. ∆x is increasing in the degree of social polarization.
Proposition 1 shows that the difference in expected payoffs is weakly increasing in both the de-
gree of social polarization and the degree of polarization in policy preferences. The comparative
statics of the model with respect to q and λ are also illustrated in Figure 2. Note that we do
not formulate Proposition 1 in terms of the partial derivative with respect to q and λ. This is
due to the fact that with m = 1, ∆x is not a continuous function of q and λ. Instead, linear
utility predicts that candidates allocating all policy at the middle for low levels of q, λ, and
switch to allocating all policy to the partisan extreme for higher levels of q, λ.7 Therefore, as
illustrated in the right graph of Figure 2 there is a discrete upward jump in ∆x at the point
where candidates switch from centrist to extreme policy. However, the main comparative static
predictions are similar with m = 1: ∆x is increasing in λ since the switching point shift left
for higher levels of λ, and ∆x is increasing in q both due to the discontinuity, and due to the
increasing probability that voters have an ideal point at the partisan extreme.




















Figure 2: These graphs shows the relative policy payoffs for electing the in-group candidate
(∆x) as a function of the polarization in policy preferences (q), for different values of λ: 0.95
(orange, dot-dashed), 0.75 (blue, dashed), and 0.55 (red, solid), for square root utility (m = 2;
left graph) and linear utility (m = 1; right graph).
2.3 Voters’ electoral decisions:
Having detailed candidates’ equilibrium behavior under the two different behavioral models,
we turn to the main object of interest: voters’ decisions. Note that while voting, citizens
only observe the candidates’ identity and valence. While valence directly enters citizens’ payoff
functions, identity only enters indirectly through the correlation between identity and policy
choices. Therefore, the relationship between identity and distributional preferences is the key
component used by citizens to form beliefs over the ex post policy decisions of the candidates.
Take ∆α to be equal to the relative valence of the out-group candidate:
∆α = αI
− − αI .
Note that ∆x is calculated as in-group payoffs minus out-group payoffs, while ∆α is calculated
as out-group valence minus in-group valence; however, given this definition both ∆x and the
cutoff value of ∆α at which voters prefer the out-group candidate (this cutoff value provides
a measure of partisan voting and will be major element of our analysis) are both positive for
λ > 0.
The following proposition characterizes voting behavior under the benchmark model.
Proposition 2 (Voting: Benchmark model)
If candidates’ distributional preferences are characterized by efficiency, then voters will vote for
the in-group candidate if and only if:
∆α ≤ 0. (7)
Since the candidates will both choose a centrist policy, voters maximize their payoffs by voting
for the candidate with the highest valence.
As implied by Lemma 3 and as illustrated in the following proposition, the voting calculus
becomes more complicated when agents have distributional preferences that favor the in-group.
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Proposition 3 (Voting: Identity model)
If agents’ distributional preferences are characterized by group identity, then voters will vote
for the in-group candidate if and only if:
E[xi|pI ]− E[xi|pI
−
] = ∆x ≥ ∆α. (8)
Proposition 3 shows that, relative to the Benchmark model, voters may have an instrumental
incentive to vote for an in-group candidate with lower relative valence; we refer to this behavior—
voting for an in-group candidate with lower relative valence—as Partisan Voting.




0 under Benchmark model,
∆x under Identity model.
In the following corollary, we utilize this definition to compare the comparative statics of voting
behavior under the Benchmark and Identity models.
Corollary 1 (Voting: comparative statics)
(i) Under the Benchmark model, ∆̃α is constant for all q.
(ii) Under the Identity model, ∆̃α is increasing in q.
(iii) For q = 0, ∆̃α = 0 under both the Benchmark and Identity models.
The formal theory that we present in this section illustrates a novel insight regarding the
relationship between social polarization and polarization in policy preferences. Namely, the
impact of social polarization on partisan voting is a function of the degree of underlying polar-
ization in policy preferences (see Corollary 1 (ii)). Importantly, this relationship is driven by
the indirect, instrumental impact of social polarization: Intuitively, when policy preferences are
homogeneous, there is little scope for choosing a policy that favors the in-group, and voters will
expect the candidates to take a centrist policy if elected. Therefore, voters will prioritize the
valence dimension when voting. As policy preferences polarize, however, voters will expect can-
didates to take partisan policy positions and partisan identity becomes the dominant concern
when selecting between the candidates.
2.4 Hypotheses
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 summarize the main theoretical findings that inform our empirical
strategy for testing the suitability of the two models for explaining our experimental data. As
we explain in detail below, our experimental setting closely replicates our theoretical model, and
we gather data on both candidates’ policy choices and voters’ electoral decisions given different
levels of policy polarization (q). Additionally, we attempt to vary the salience of social identity
underlying the degree of social polarization by using different natural identities (λ).
Our theoretical predictions concern the candidates’ choices regarding the relative payoffs
of in-group voters versus out-group voters, ∆x, and the maximum valence difference for which
voters will vote for the in-group candidate, ∆̃α. Beginning with the candidates’ decision, the
predictions for ∆x are summarized in Table 1.
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Social polarization
Policy Benchmark model Identity model
Polarization λ = 0.5 λ = low λ = high
q = 0 ∆x = 0 ∆x = 0 ∆x = 0
q = low ∆x = 0 ∆x = low ∆x = medium
q = high ∆x = 0 ∆x = medium ∆x = high
Table 1: Qualitative predictions for candidates’ policy choices under the Benchmark Model
and Identity Model given different levels of policy polarization (q) and social polarization
(λ). Relative levels (low, medium, high) are specified for purposes of illustration.
Table 1 follows directly from Proposition 1: When q = 0, candidates cannot allocate policy
in a way that favors the in-group since all voters have the same ideal point, and therefore
∆x = 0 mechanically. Likewise, when λ = 0.5 (the benchmark model), ∆x = 0 since candidates
maximize aggregate welfare and choose a centrist policy. If candidates’ distributional preferences
are skewed towards the in-group, however, then ∆x ≥ 0 for q > 0, and ∆x is increasing in q and
λ.
For the candidates’ choice of policy, we will consider the following two hypotheses to test
the suitability of the identity model:
Hypothesis 1
Given q > 0, ∆x > 0.
The benchmark model predicts that ∆x = 0 for all q, while the identity model predicts ∆x ≥ 0
for q > 0; therefore, the level of ∆x when q > 0 provides evidence of whether candidates’
preferences are better characterized by the benchmark or identity model.8
Hypothesis 2
∆x is increasing in q.
Additionally, since we are able to directly control q in our experiment, we test the second
hypothesis derived from the identity model that ∆x is increasing in q.
Lastly, on the candidate side, we consider the prediction that ∆x is increasing in λ. Note
that in our experimental setting, we will not be able to directly control the magnitude of
λ, in the sense that λ is induced through the group manipulation rather than directly as-
signed. Instead, we rely on the comparison of minimal-group identities and naturally-occurring
identities—arguably, subjects will be more biased towards in-group members (higher λ) if the
subjects are sorted into groups based on salient natural identities. Therefore, the following
hypothesis is not a test of the identity model per se; rather, it indirectly tests whether our
experimental treatments are successful in increasing λ.
Hypothesis 3
∆x is higher with natural identities than with minimal-group identities.
8Note that this hypothesis essentially considers whether the results of earlier studies that have found an
in-group bias, such as Chen and Chen (2011), replicate in our setting.
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Next, we consider the predictions regarding voters’ choices. Table 2 summarizes our theo-
retical predictions for partisan voting, ∆̃α.
Social polarization
Policy Benchmark model Identity model
Polarization λ = 0.5 λ = low λ = high
q = 0 ∆̃α = 0 ∆̃α = 0 ∆̃α = 0
q = low ∆̃α = 0 ∆̃α = low ∆̃α = medium
q = high ∆̃α = 0 ∆̃α = medium ∆̃α = high
Table 2: Qualitative predictions for partisan voting under the Benchmark Model and Iden-
tity Model given different levels of policy polarization and social polarization.
Note that Table 2 replicates the predictions of Table 1, since the instrumental incentive to
vote for the in-group candidate depends directly on ∆x.
However, as discussed in the introduction, voters may also have an expressive motive to vote
for the in-group candidate. Accordingly, our main hypothesis to distinguish whether subjects’
voting decisions are consistent with the identity model is not that ∆̃α > 0 for q > 0, since this
result can be explained with a model of expressive payoffs. Instead, we consider the prediction
that partisan voting is increasing in q, which cannot be explained by an constant expressive
incentive.9
Hypothesis 4
∆̃α is increasing in q.
Additionally, we also consider the prediction that partisan voting is increasing in λ. How-
ever, we are only able to test the following hypothesis if we are able to reject the null hypothesis
that ∆x is higher in the natural identity treatments relative to the minimal-group identity treat-
ment (Hypothesis 3), which would indicate that our natural identity treatments were successful
in inducing a higher λ.
Hypothesis 5
∆̃α is increasing in λ.
Lastly, to preview our results, we do not find that our natural identity treatments result in
stronger identities (which would have meant, arguably, a higher degree of social polarization).
Therefore, we are unable to provide a direct test of Hypothesis 5. However, absent variation in
social polarization from the natural identity treatments, we explore two alternative metrics for
social polarization by comparing “strong” and “weak” partisans and analyzing the impact of
multiple identities. These alternative measures provide suggestive evidence that partisan voting
is increasing in social polarization (see Section B in the appendix, “Suggestive evidence on the
impact of higher social polarization”).
9In Section 4.4 following our main empirical analysis, we discuss the assumptions required for empirical




Our experimental design largely mirrors the theoretical framework previewed above with the
exception that, given that we use the strategy method, all voter and candidate choices are effec-
tively simultaneous (in particular, candidate choices are taken before observing voter behavior).
In our baseline identity treatment, the minimal-group A vs B treatment, subjects are randomly
assigned into one of two groups of equal size, “Group A” or “Group B,” after they receive in-
structions for the voting game but before the voting game commences. We exogenously induce
social polarization by this standard minimal-group intervention because it has been shown to
result in group conflict and an in-group preference (Tajfel and Billig, 1974; Goette, Huffman and
Meier, 2006; Chen and Li, 2009; Landa and Duell, 2015) but also precludes that group member-
ship is systematically correlated with other subject characteristics. Note that our minimal-group
treatment does not actively promote a group identity, subjects are simply informed that they
are assigned to Group A or Group B. Despite this very minimal intervention, however, we find
that subjects systematically condition both their policy choices and voting choices on identity.
After subjects have been assigned to a group, the voting game stage implements the struc-
ture and payoffs as laid out in Section 2 and utilizes the strategy method. That is, each subject
makes decisions in the role of a candidate and in the role of a voter for all potential distribu-
tions of voters’ ideal points and, for voters, all possible combinations of candidate valence before
election results are revealed.
As in the theoretical model, identity groups correspond to voters’ ideal points in the three-
point policy space. Specifically, we vary the degree of polarization in voters’ policy preferences
by changing the probability that voters will draw an ideal point at the partisan extreme. For
example, in the case of no polarization in policy preferences (q = 0), all voters have ideal points
at the center; in the case of full polarization (q = 1), subjects in one group have an ideal point
at the left (Group A) while subjects in the other group have ideal point at the right (Group B).
Subjects take decisions for five different levels of policy polarization, q = {0, .25, .5, .75, 1}.
All subjects know the value of q while making their decisions. As candidates, subjects chose
how to allocate up to ten tokens to the three positions of a preference space, Left, Center, or
Right. Candidates make one policy allocation for each q and do not observe their valence before
making a policy allocation.
As voters, subjects make a choice between two candidates (one from each group) knowing
both q and the valence of the candidates, but before drawing their individual ideal point. The
valence of candidates is either low, medium, or high, which corresponds to a voter payoff (in
tokens) of 2, 3 and 5. Subjects took decisions as voters for all possible valence combinations for
each level of q. On the subject screens, the valence factor is referred to as “ability.”
Subjects’ decisions were organized into “blocks” for each level of q. At the beginning of each
block q is announced. Subjects then make their allocation decision in the role of a candidate
and then make 9 voting decisions between candidate pairs with varying valence. Both the order
of decision blocks and order of the assigned candidate valence pairs within those blocks was
randomized; therefore, subjects face decision environments in different orders. In total, subjects
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make 5 decisions as candidate and 45 decisions as voter.10 After the voting game, subjects also
play one round of a dictator game and answer a questionnaire about basic demographics and
the choices they made in the experiment.
Lastly, we conduct additional treatments using natural identities rather than minimal
groups represents in an attempt to induce variation in social polarization (λ). Arguably, subjects
will be more biased towards in-group members—increased social polarization—if the subjects
are sorted into groups based on salient natural identities. (However, as we will detail in the
results section, we do not find evidence of a higher λ in the natural identity treatments.) The
Bike vs Car - and Dem vs Rep-treatments both feature endogenous sorting into groups based on
natural identities. Importantly, in both the natural identities treatments, subjects are truthfully
told that in the pool of subjects from which they were recruited to participate in the experiment,
the distribution of subjects across the two groups is close to equal.
We conduct the experiment in the laboratories of Technical University Berlin and Florida
State University. For the Florida sample, subjects were allocated to groups based on whether
they reported to feel closer to Democrats or Republicans.11 For the Berlin sample, subjects were
allocated to groups based on whether they reported that they are more likely to use their bike or
their car.12 While this may seem a strange choice of an identity-group, a pre-experiment survey
of the experimental pool in Berlin showed that students rank the car/bike-divide as being more
important then religious or political affiliations, and that subjects are evenly split between car
and bike.
To place the results from Florida in context, the sessions were run in June of 2016, shortly
after Donald Trump had secured the nomination as the Republican presidential candidate.
Given the contentious nature of the 2016 presidential election, we had the ex ante expectation
that the level of in-group bias induced by subjects party identity would be significantly greater
than a minimal-group group intervention.
3.2 Payoffs
Subjects are paid depending on their and other subjects’ choices in one randomly chosen decision
situation of the voting game (and their choices in the dictator game). That is, one subject from
each identity group is chosen to be a candidate and is assigned a level of valence, and one
distribution of voters’ ideal points, q, is randomly selected. Next, the subjects’ actual voting
decisions for this value of q and pair of candidate valence are used to determine the winning
candidate: the candidate with the largest vote share is the winning candidate and receives 15
tokens; the losing candidate receives 5 tokens.
Finally, the winning candidate’s token allocation determines the payoffs of the subjects
not chosen as candidates (voters): each subjects’ ideal point was drawn randomly according to
10 An exact overview over the decision environment for each round of the experiment can be found in Section
C.1 in the appendix. We control for the order of the assignment to blocks in the analysis below by including
decision order variables as appropriate.
11 We ran this treatment at Florida since questionnaires showed that their subject pool was roughly evenly
divided between Democrats and Republicans – we also informed subjects of this fact before they select a group.
12 In German: “Sagen Sie uns bitte, ob Sie öfters Ihr Fahrrad oder Auto benutzen?
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the distribution of ideal points selected to determine payoffs. Corresponding to the model, if
assigned an extreme ideal point, A-voters (B-voters) receive 1 token for each 1 token allocated
to Left (Right) and .5 tokens for each 1 token allocated to the Center.13 Subjects assigned an
ideal point of Center receive 1 token for each token allocated to center, and .5 tokens for each
token allocated to Right or Left.
Additionally, all voters receive 2 tokens if the winning candidate has “low” valence, 3 tokens
if “average” valence, and 5 tokens if “high” valence. Subjects also received a 5 Euro (7 Dollars)
show-up fee, plus the tokens they earned at an exchange rate of 60 cents for 1 token.
3.3 Empirical strategy
The experiment presented above is designed to test the theoretical hypotheses specified in
Section 2.4. It is set to identify whether identity has an instrumental impact on partisan voting
and distinguish between the identity and benchmark models. As we discuss in the introduction,
in-group bias in voting decisions can be due to either instrumental or expressive concerns.
Therefore, our main identification strategy utilizes the within-subject variation in choices as a
function of q—expressive payoffs are constant for all levels of q, while Proposition 1 shows that
the instrumental impact of identity is increasing in q. We also examine the robustness of our
empirical strategy to distinguish between the expressive and instrumental impact of identity in
detail in Section 4.4 below.
We identify in-group bias in candidates’ allocation decisions by the relative expected in-
group token payoff that realizes given candidates’ allocation decision (∆x). Since ∆x measures
the difference in payoffs to the in-group relative to the out-group, a positive value of ∆x indicates
that candidates’ policy allocation biases payoffs to the in-group. We identify partisan voting at
the individual level by the maximum difference in the token payoff from the valence of out-group
and in-group candidate for which voters vote for the in-group candidate (∆̃α), top-coded at 3
for subjects who vote for the in-group candidate for all valence differences.14
Note that since candidates’ policy choices do not impact their own payoffs, our experiment
identifies the in-group bias in candidates’ policy choices. Our experiment, however, does not
specifically identify the mechanism for this in-group bias. In the theory section, we assume
that—consistent with the findings of earlier experimental studies—candidates’ distributional
preferences are biased towards the payoffs of members of the in-group. An alternative explana-
13 In the natural identity treatment, Democrat-voters and Bike-voters (Republican-voters and Car-voters)
receive receive 1 token for each 1 token allocated to Left (Right) and .5 tokens for each 1 token allocated to the
Center.
14 In the appendix, we additionally report results associated with an alternative operationalization of (∆̃α)
where we compute for each voter the minimum relative valence of the out-group candidate ∆α at which the out-
group candidate is still elected, the threshold limiting an in-group vote is then simply just below that minimum.
We will refer to this measure as (min(∆α), see Section D.4). Additionally, top-coding could obscure variance
between our identity treatments if, say, more subjects have extreme in-group preferences in the natural identity
treatment relative to the minimal-group treatment. This, however, does not appear to be the case, and the
null findings regarding the additional impact of natural identities do not seem to stem from a ceiling effect: the
proportion of subjects who vote for the in-group candidate across all valence differences is relatively similar in the
minimal and natural identity treatments (in fact, more subjects systematically vote for the in-group candidate
for the minimal-group treatment; see Figure D.3 in the Appendix).
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tion for an in-group bias exists that is based on a reciprocity motive: irrespective of identity,
candidates may reciprocate voter support by biasing policy in favor of their voters.15 In our
experiment, however, candidates do not observe votes prior to choosing policy, since we use the
strategy method. Therefore, candidates cannot directly reward the individuals who voted for
them. Instead, candidates may anticipate that voters will disproportionately vote for the in-
group candidate, and may reciprocate ‘in advance.’ Note that identity is also key for this second
mechanism—without identity to coordinate expectations, candidates would have no reason to
systematically bias policy towards one of the two groups of voters. Therefore, while both mech-
anisms may contribute to candidates’ in-group bias, we refer to the effect as an instrumental
impact of identity.
For Hypothesis 1 we consider a simple difference in the average payoffs to in-group and
out-group members that result from the candidate policy choices, pooled across q. We test Hy-
potheses 2-5, by estimating the following two linear models on the experimental data. The first
model considers the impact of policy polarization, q, and natural identities, NI, on candidate
i’s partisan bias in allocation decisions:
∆xi = β
q qi + β
NI×qNIi × qi + βo oi + εi,
where oi indicates the order in which decision situations (characterized by q) are presented to i.
Note that this model does not feature an intercept since ∆x is mechanically equal to zero when
q = 0. Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive coefficient βq, and Hypothesis 3 predicts an additional
impact of natural identities (βNI×q > 0).
The second model considers the impact of policy polarization, q, on voter i’s partisan bias
in voting decisions:
∆̃αi = δ0 + δ
q q + δNI NI + δNI×qNI × q + δo oi + εi.
Note that our second empirical model includes an intercept. As discussed above, voters might
prefer to vote for the in-group candidate for expressive reasons—these expressive motives, how-
ever, are captured in δ0 and δ
NI , since these coefficients estimate voters’ willingness to vote
for the in-group candidate when there is no possible bias in the candidates’ policy allocations
(again, when q = 0 policy payoffs are mechanically equal for all voters). Therefore, δq and
δNI×q cleanly identify the instrumental impact of identity on voters’ decisions, and are used to
test Hypotheses 4 and 5, respectively.
We estimate our two empirical models on the data from Berlin and Florida separately. We
employ the ordinary least square estimator for all specifications of candidate and voter model,
clustering errors at the subject level. The unit of analysis is the subject-q pair, that is for each
subject i we observe five values of ∆xi and ∆̃
α
i , one value for each of the five realizations of
policy polarization q.
15We thank Reviewer 1 for suggesting this alternative mechanism.
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3.4 Session statistics
In 7 sessions, with 24 subjects each (one with 26), we collect, for each subject, 45 observations
as voter and 5 observations as candidate. In total, we collect observations on 170 subjects with
a total of 7650 voter-round and 850 candidate-round observations.16 Given that subjects make
decisions using the strategy method we have as many independent observations as subjects in
the experiment. Subjects earning range from 7.7 to 20 Euro, average session earnings range
from 12.9 to 18 Euros.17 We ran 4 sessions in the laboratory at Technical University Berlin (2
sessions for the baseline A vs B treatment and 2 sessions for the Bike vs Car -treatment) and 3
sessions in the laboratory at Florida State University (1 session for the A vs B treatment and
2 sessions for the Dem vs Rep-treatment).18
4 Results
The main purpose of the experiment is to identify whether subjects’ choices are consistent with
the identity model and to identify the instrumental impact of social polarization on voters’
identity-contingent voting. More specifically, we evaluate whether there is evidence to support
the hypotheses laid out in Section 2.4 that distinguish between the identity and benchmark
models. Following the order of our theoretical section, we first consider subjects’ choices as
candidates, followed by their decisions as voters.
Before we evaluate our specific theoretical predictions, we characterize subject behavior
towards in-group and out-group. Overall, we find that behavior is highly dependent on the
in-group/out-group designation. When in the role of a candidate, subjects make allocation
decisions in a way that generats, on average, significantly higher expected token payoffs for
in-group than out-group voters in the minimal group identity and natural identity treatments.
This result holds true overall as well as in decision situations with q = 1, a situation where
the candidate policy allocation decision is comparable to a “divide the dollar game.” This also
allows us to compare our results to earlier experimental findings: we find that our estimated
in-group bias is a bit higher than the range found by Chen and Li (2009), who estimate an
in-group bias of between 3.22 − 3.84 (we normalize their results to 10 tokens). Additionally,
as voters subjects are, on average, significantly more likely to vote for the in-group than the
out-group candidate in all treatments. These results are listed in Table 3 below.19
16 These numbers of observations result in 850 subject-level of policy polarization (q) observations relevant for
the regression analysis of candidate and voter choices presented below.
17Table D.1 in the appendix provides an overview of these statistics.
18 Additionally, Table D.2 in the appendix gives the summary statistics on allocation decision, ∆x, voting
decision, and ∆̃α by treatment.
19 Whenever we report a p-values associated with the relevant one or two-sample t-test at a given level α
we also check that the respective 1 − α (subject-level clustered) bootstrapped confidence interval of the test
statistic does not contain 0 and confirm our interpretation with the result from the appropriate difference-in-
distribution test (clustered Wilcoxon sign rank or rank sum test). When we report p-values associated with the
exact binomial test on vote choice, we check those against whether the respective 1 − α confidence interval of
differences in vote share in in-group and out-group, computed from bootstrapped vote choice (clustered at the
subject-level), contains 0.
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A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep
In-Group/Out-Group In Out Diff. In Out Diff. In Out Diff.
Average expected 7.31 5.43 1.88∗∗∗ 7.59 5.37 2.22∗∗∗ 7.01 5.39 1.62∗∗∗
policy payoff (0.13) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) (0.21) (0.14) (0.13) (0.22)
Expected policy 7.38 2.47 4.91∗∗∗ 7.80 2.16 5.64∗∗∗ 6.73 2.83 3.90∗∗∗
payoff q = 1 (0.27) (0.25) (0.32) (0.50) (0.31) (0.63) (0.31) (0.28) (0.54)
Average vote share 0.76 0.24 0.52∗∗∗ 0.76 0.24 0.52∗∗∗ 0.80 0.20 0.60∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Standard errors clustered by subject
Asterisk indicates difference in-group/out-group significant at: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3: Mean of expected payoff from candidate allocation (overall and at q = 1) and candidate
vote share. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance of the differences between
in-group and out-group are tested using a paired t-test/exact binomial test.
4.1 Candidate policy choices
First we consider whether, on average, candidates’ policy choices are biased in the sense that
they resulted in higher expected payoffs to in-group members (Hypothesis 1). As discussed
above, the first row of Table 3 shows that candidates’ policy decisions are systematically biased
towards in-group voters’ payoffs across all identity treatments. Moreover, the average difference
between in-group and out-group payoffs are statistically significant at the one-percent level.
These results provide evidence to support Hypothesis 1, and suggests that candidate choices
are better explained by the identity model, since the benchmark model predicts that candidates
will equalize the expected payoffs of the two groups of voters.
Summarizing,
Result 1
When policy polarization exists, candidate allocation decisions favor in-group voters; that is
∆x > 0 when q > 0.
4.1.1 The impact of policy polarization on candidates’ choices:
Next, we consider the impact of policy polarization on the candidates’ policy allocations. Figure
3 displays expected policy payoffs of in-group and out-group voters by the level of policy polar-
ization, while Figure 4 shows ∆x as a function of q. Both figures hint at support for Hypothesis
2 since the average level of ∆x, the difference in expected payoff from candidates’ allocations
to in-group and out-group voters, is increasing in q. Two sample t-tests indicate a significantly
higher payoff from the allocation of tokens to in-group than to out-group voters at every level
of q > 0 with p < .01. In particular, at q = .25, the difference is .34 (.21, .47) and at q = 1 the
20



























Figure 3: Average token payoff from the al-
locations by in-group (black) and out-group
(white) candidates plotted over policy polar-
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Figure 4: Difference in average token payoffs
from the allocations by in-group and out-group
candidates (∆x) in the A vs B treatment.
We investigate Hypothesis 2 more thoroughly by estimating our first empirical model. The
results of the regression are presented in Table 4 below; our main specification is presented in
columns (5) and (6), and we also estimate the model on the minimal-group and natural identity
treatments separately for completeness (columns 1-4). The coefficient estimates of βq in all
treatments in both Berlin and Florida are all positive and significantly different from zero with
p < .01. We find that for an increase in q from no policy polarization (q = 0) to perfect policy
polarization (q = 1), the relative in-group token payoff from candidates’ allocations increases
by 4.20− 4.58 in the minimal group treatments.
These results strongly support Hypothesis 2:
Result 2
With rising policy polarization, candidates’ policy choices increasingly favor in-group voters;
that is, ∆x is increasing in q.
4.1.2 The impact of natural identities on candidates’ choices:
Lastly we explore whether our natural identity treatments resulted in a stronger in-group bias in
candidates’ policy choices (higher λ), relative to our minimal-group treatment. We hypothesize
that natural identities will result in a higher level of social polarization, and hence a larger ∆x
at each level of policy polarization (q).
Surprisingly, we find no significant difference comparing mean of ∆x in minimal group
identity and natural identity treatments: the average ∆x across all candidate choices with
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q > 0 is 2.32 (1.93, 2.74) in the A vs B treatment and 2.40 (2.02, 2.74) in the natural identity
treatments.20
Table 4: Relative in-group token payoff from candidate policy choices (∆x) regressed on policy
polarization q (columns 1-6). Columns 5 and 6 list the estimates of a regression of ∆x on q and
the interaction of a dummy for the natural identity treatments (Bike vs Car in Berlin, Dem vs
Rep in Florida) and q. We also include the decision order in all regressions.
Dependent variable: ∆x
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep
Berlin Florida Berlin Florida Berlin Florida
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q 4.52∗∗∗ 4.73∗∗∗ 4.78∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗∗ 4.62∗∗∗ 5.23∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.79) (0.56) (0.51) (0.56) (0.85)
q× Natural identity 1.01 -1.29
(0.80) (1.01)
Observations 240 130 240 240 480 370
Subjects 48 26 48 48 96 74
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.53 .57 .46 0.53 0.49
F-Statistic 38.30∗∗∗ 21.44∗∗∗ 65.02∗∗∗ 28.36∗∗∗ 62.30∗∗∗ 33.13∗∗∗
Standard errors clustered by subject
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Additionally, the identity model predicts a stronger impact of q on ∆x with a higher degree
of social polarization (see Figure 2 in Section 2 for an illustration). However, in the estimation
of our first empirical model, presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4, the interaction term
between q and the natural identity treatment is not significantly different from zero for either
the Berlin or Florida samples.
Together, these findings show no support for Hypothesis 3:
Result 3
Candidate policy choices are not more favorable towards the in-group with natural identity
than with minimal group identity; that is, we do not find evidence that social polarization, λ,
is higher in the natural identity treatment.
4.2 Voter election decisions
Next, we turn to the main object of interest: the impact of social polarization on voters’ voting
decisions. As outlined in our theory section, the identity model predicts that in a setting with
both policy polarization and social polarization, voters will anticipate the in-group bias of the
20 See Figure D.1 in the appendix for more detail regarding the distributions of ∆x across treatments.
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candidates, and hence be willing to vote for in-group candidates with lower relative valence
(partisan voting). Moreover, partisan voting is predicted to increase with the degree of policy
polarization.
First we look at the summary statistics. Under perfect polarization (q = 1), we find a
strong bias among voters to elect a candidate of their group: the average rate of in-group
voting is .81 (.76, .85). Also, as to be expected, voters overwhelmingly vote for the in-group
candidate whenever the valence of the out-group candidate is lower than the valence of the
in-group candidate, for any level of policy polarization (the rate of “anti-partisan” voting is less
than five percent across all elections). Figure 5 illustrates the average in-group vote share at

























Figure 5: In-group candidate vote share plot-
ted over relative payoff from the ability of the
out-group candidate (∆α) for no (q = 0; black)
and perfect policy polarization (q = 1; grey) in













Figure 6: Mean of maximum relative payoff
from the valence of the out-group candidate
(∆̃α) voters accept and still vote for the in-
group candidate plotted over policy polariza-
tion (q) in the A vs B treatment.
4.2.1 The instrumental impact of identity on partisan voting:
While Figure 5 confirms that voters are willing to vote for in-group candidates with lower
relative valence, it does not distinguish between partisan voting due to expressive concerns and
partisan voting due to an anticipated in-group bias in candidates’ policy choices. Figure 6, which
illustrates the average individual willingness to vote for the in-group candidate as a function of
q, shows that ∆̃α is just under 1 when q = 0, but rises to approximately 1.8 when q = 1. This
suggests that partisan voting is driven by both expressive and instrumental concerns.
To test the instrumental impact of social polarization on partisan voting statistically, we
estimate our second empirical model and report the results in Table 5 (columns (5) and (6)).
Any expressive impact of identity on partisan voting is captured by the constant (see Section 4.4
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for details), while the coefficient on q estimates the instrumental impact of identity on partisan
voting. We estimate a positive impact of q on ∆̃α in all treatments, with point estimates 0.86
and 0.88 for the minimal group treatments in Berlin and Florida, respectively, and all coefficient
estimates are statistically significant with p < .01, other than the natural identity in Berlin,
which is not statistically significant.21
Table 5: Maximum difference in the relative valence of the out-group candidate at which voters
still vote for the in-group candidate (∆̃α) regressed on policy polarization q (columns 1-4) and
natural identity treatment (columns 5 and 6); decision order included in all regressions.
Dependent variable: ∆̃a
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep
Berlin Florida Berlin Florida Berlin Florida
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q 0.858∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 0.243 0.687∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗
(0.185) (0.330) (0.166) (0.176) (0.184) (0.331)
Natural identity 0.235 0.024
(0.239) (0.434)
q× Natural identity -0.620∗∗ -0.305
(0.248) (0.374)
Constant 0.913∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.327) (0.204) (0.250) (0.209) (0.292)
Observations 240 130 240 240 480 370
Subjects 48 26 48 48 96 74
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.040 -0.001 0.030 0.022 0.346
F Statistic 10.82∗∗∗ 3.63∗∗ 1.50 9.75∗∗∗ 6.16∗∗∗ 6.42∗∗∗
Standard errors clustered by subject
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The positive findings in both our baseline treatments regarding the instrumental impact of
social polarization on partisan voting support our main prediction, Hypothesis 4:
Result 4
In the baseline minimal-group treatment, when social polarization exists, partisan voting in-
creases as policy polarization (q) increases.
Lastly we highlight that, in addition to the aggregate results, subjects respond to instru-
mental incentives at the individual level, which suggests that partisan voting is not driven by
21 The null finding in the natural identity treatment is interesting given that candidate policy choices were the
most biased in this treatment. Even though it is not statistically significant, Figure D.4 in the Appendix shows
a consistent increase in the mean ∆̃α as q increases, but at a must lower rate than the other treatments. It could
be the case that our experiment is too low-powered to capture a smaller impact of q.
24
a subset of voters who always vote along partisan lines: only 14 percent of voters vote for the
in-group candidate when policy polarization is low and ∆α is high, while 61 percent vote for the
in-group candidate when policy polarization is high and ∆α is low. Overall, our result regarding
the instrumental impact of identity is increasing in q is robust to subject-level heterogeneity.
The distribution of individual-level choices display the same relationship between q and ∆x, and
mostly the same relationship between subject-specific ∆̃α and q. Moreover, we show that the
subject-level heterogeneity in partisan voting can be traced back to subjects best responding to
their own allocation decisions.22
4.2.2 The impact of natural identity on partisan voting:
Finally, we consider the impact of natural identities on partisan voting (Hypothesis 5). Note
that we can only properly test Hypothesis 5 if our experiment is successful in inducing stronger
identities in our natural identity treatments than our minimal group treatment (higher λ).
Therefore, given our null finding for Hypothesis 3, which tests for a higher λ in the natural
identity treatments, we cannot evaluate Hypothesis 5.23 However, we present the analysis here
for completeness.
Our results on voter choices are consistent with the null finding for Hypothesis 3 on candi-
date allocations: we find no evidence that partisan voting is higher under the natural identity
treatments than the minimal-group treatment. On average, the vote share of the the in-group
candidate is .77 (.73, .80) in the A vs B treatment, .76 (.72, .79) in the Bike vs Car treatment,
and .80 (.76, .83) in the Dem vs Rep treatment. Additionally, the coefficient on the interaction
of q and natural identity, presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 is neither positive nor
significantly different from zero for either of the natural identity treatments.
Our final result follows:
Result 5
In our main specification, we do not find evidence of an additional instrumental impact of social
polarization on partisan voting in the natural identity treatments.
Absent variation in social polarization from the natural identity treatments, we are unable
to provide a direct test of Hypothesis 5. However, in the Appendix, we explore two alternative
metrics for social polarization by comparing “strong” and “weak” partisans and analyzing the
impact of multiple identities. These alternative measures provide suggestive evidence that
partisan voting is increasing in social polarization (see Section B in the Appendix).
4.3 Discussion
Overall, with positive findings for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, we find strong support for the pre-
dictions of the identity model. That is, we find that in both the minimal group and natural
22 Section D.6 in the appendix details more of the analysis of subject-level heterogeneity.
23 We do find that subjects in the Dem vs Rep treatment self-report a significantly higher feeling of closeness
to their identity group in the exit survey than this is the case for subjects in the A vs B treatment (p < .05).
They also offer a larger share of their endowment as first mover in a dictator game to in-group than out-group
partners (p < .05).
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identity treatments, candidates’ choices are biased towards the partisan in-group, confirming
that subjects’ identity biases their distributional preferences towards in-group members.
We also find that voters are biased towards the in-group candidate, in the sense that they
are willing to vote for an in-group candidate with lower relative valence (partisan voting). Our
test of Hypothesis 3 confirms that partisan voting is more than an expressive phenomenon: the
fact that partisan voting is increasing in q confirms that voters anticipate the in-group bias of
the candidates, and strategically vote for the in-group candidate in a manner that reflects the
changing instrumental incentives.
4.4 Robustness to expressive payoffs
In the model presented above, we do not explicitly model the expressive impact of identity on
voting behavior. In an earlier version of the paper (see Duell and Valasek, 2018) we analyze
a model where agents receive an expressive payoff for voting for the in-group candidate: there
we show that if agents receive expressive payoffs, however, then the voter’s decision becomes a
simple calculus of comparing the expressive payoff for voting for the in-group candidate and the
relative valence of the out-group candidate, weighed by the perceived probability of influencing
the election outcome.
Accordingly, we can use the following strategy to identify a lower bound on the instrumental
impact of identity on partisan voting.
1. Since both candidates select centrist policies when there is no polarization in voters’ policy
preference, if ∆̃α > 0 when q = 0 the in-group voting bias is driven by expressive motives.
2. Assuming the probability of being pivotal is not negatively correlated with q, if ∆̃α > 0 is
higher for q > 0 relative to q = 0, then the increase in the in-group voting bias is driven
by instrumental motives.
This identification strategy does depend on the assumption that the probability of being
pivotal is not negatively correlated with q – if this assumption is violated, then expressive
voting may be increasing in q since voting expressively become less costly (in expectation) as
the probability of being pivotal decreases. However, given the structure of our model, the
probability of being pivotal is increasing with the rate of in-group voting: since the probability
of being pivotal is the highest when a randomly-drawn voter is equally likely to vote for each
candidate, the probability of being pivotal is maximized when all agents vote for the in-group
candidate. This implies that the probability of being pivotal is increasing in ∆̃α, and hence
increasing in q. Additionally, this assumption is consistent with our empirical findings: as we
show below, the average margin of victory is decreasing in q.
To empirically assess the appropriateness of the pivotality assumption, we first check whether
the margin of victory (the closeness of the election) is positively correlated with policy polar-
ization in our experimental data. Given the low observations of tied elections, we follow the
literature on elections and use the margin of victory as a proxy for the probability of a tied
election (a tied election is more likely with a lower margin of victory).
We test our assumption by regressing the margin of victory on q, valence of the in-group
candidate, and valence of the out-group candidate. We conclude that there is not a positive
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relationship between q and the margin of victory: the coefficient estimate on q is −.19 (−.41, .03)
with p = .06 in the A vs B treatment, −.12 (−.87, .63) in the Bike vs Car treatment, and
−.11 (−.70, .48) in the Dem vs Rep treatment.24
Given that we do not find evidence of a a positive relationship between q and the margin of
victory—indeed there is weak evidence of a negative relationship, consistent with the theory—
we infer that there is no evidence to support the claim that the probability of being pivotal
is decreasing with the degree of partisan voting. In fact, our coefficient estimates point to a
positive correlation between q and the probability of being pivotal. Therefore, the observed
voting behavior is consistent with our interpretation of partisan voting for q = 0 as a lower
bound on the instrumental impact of identity on partisan voting.
Second, we consider the share of votes among all votes in which subjects were actually
pivotal: that is, the proportion of votes that resulted in a tie or that were decided by a win
margin of two (subjects voting with the majority are pivotal given a win margin of two). We
find that subjects were pivotal in a significant proportion of elections, but that most of the
pivotal elections occurred when there was no difference in valence between the two candidates
(see Figure C.5 in the appendix for a graphical representation of pivotal elections as a function of
valence differences and policy polarization). However, we find that for each identity treatment,
there was at least one election where the candidates had different valence and voters were
pivotal, showing that the probability of being pivotal was non-zero.
Given the robustness of our experimental strategy of accounting for expressive payoffs, we
are also able to say something about the relative magnitude of each phenomenon: when the
political game is zero-sum (q = 0) we find that expressive voting accounts for approximately
45 percent of partisan voting, while instrumental voting accounts for the remaining 55 percent.
This suggests that both expressive and instrumental concerns are important in accounting for
the voting choices of subjects in our experiment.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we characterize and measure the impact of salient identities on candidate and voter
behavior. In particular, we demonstrate theoretically that identity can have an instrumental
effect on partisan voting by influencing voters beliefs regarding the ex post decisions of political
representatives. Our laboratory experiment largely confirms the predictions of our formal model,
and shows that identity impacts voter behavior due to both instrumental and expressive reasons.
Moreover, we show that the impact of social polarization on voting behavior is strongest when
there is large underlying polarization in voters’ policy preferences.
Our findings suggest a society divided into two groups with starkly divergent policy pref-
erences but with low levels of social polarization may still support a relatively consensual,
non-partisan and efficient political system. Instead, socially-costly partisan behavior will occur
when both policy and social polarization are high. In this case, as a society becomes polarized
24 Standard errors are clustered at the session-level. The win margin is computed for each session, treatment,
and (q,in-group valence, out-group valence)-triple. Figures C.3 and C.4 in the appendix further illustrates the
distribution of win margins and the relationship of win margins and q.
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on a social dimension that is correlated with political preferences, voters come to expect a higher
degree of partisanship from elected officials, which causes them to rationally respond by voting
along partisan lines, leading to the selection of candidates with lower average levels of quality.
This narrative is particularly problematic when applied to the US context, where evi-
dence suggests that social polarization occurs along an explicitly political dimension (Republi-
can/Democrat). In this case, a self-reinforcing cycle may arise: Social polarization leads to the
perception of increasing divergence in the policy platforms of the two parties—in turn, this may
cause partisan identities to strengthen, leading to an even greater degree of social polarization
and a further increase in partisan behavior.
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Appendix
A Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
First, note that the candidates’ aggregate payoffs are constant and equal to xl +xw. Next, note
that maxp
∑N E[v(p, pi)] = {0, 1, 0} since a “policy unit” placed at pm generates aggregate
expected payoffs of n(1 − q) + nq, while a policy unit placed at pl or pr generates aggregate
payoffs of 1/2(n(1−q)+nq) ≤ n(1−q)+nq. Therefore, since p = {0, 1, 0} maximizes aggregate
expected payoffs and results in an equal distribution of expected payoffs, p = {0, 1, 0}maximizes∑N E[v(p, pi) + αw]1/m for any m ≥ 1 and αw. Lastly, given that valence is a public good,
aggregate payoffs are higher when the candidate with αk ≥ αk′ wins the election. Together,
this implies that maximal aggregate payoffs are achieved when both candidates choose centrist
policies, and all voters vote for the highest-valence candidate. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
Since the equilibrium concept is SPNE, by backward induction, the winning candidate will






which is equivalent to the following maximization problem, maxp
∑N E[v(p, pi)+αI ]1/m, which
is equal to {0, 1, 0} by the proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 3:
As in the above proof, the winning candidate will choose the policy that maximizes their social
preferences, g(E[xi]
I ,E[xi]















For simplicity, we assume cA wins the election and sets pw = pA (pB is symmetric).
To prove the result, we focus on the marginal utility that cA receives from shifting a unit
of policy to pl, given pA = {0, 1, 0}. Note that:
E[v(pw, pi) + α
A] = q(pl + 0.5pm) + (1− q)(0.5pl + pm + 0.5pr) + αA,
for i ∈ A, and
E[v(pw, pi) + α
A] = (1− q)(0.5pl + pm + 0.5pr) + q(0.5pm + pr) + αA,



























(1− q)] > (1− λ)[1
2
(1− q) + 1
2
q]⇒ λ(2q − 1) > 1− λ. (10)
(Note that the same calculation for pr yields the equation (1−λ)(2q−1) > λ, which implies
that pr = 0, since the marginal relative utility of placing a unit of policy at the outgroup extreme
is always negative.) Therefore, pA = {0, 1, 0} if Equation 10 does not hold, and pA = {pl, pm, 0}
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with pl > 0 if Equation 10 holds. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
We prove this result separately for m = 1 and m > 1. The proof for m > 1 follows from
Expression 9 and Equation 10 in the proof of Lemma 3 above. First, fixing λ, there exists q∗





For, q < q∗, Equation 10 does not hold, and as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, the unique
equilibrium policies for both candidates set pI = {0, 1, 0}; for q > q∗, however, both candidates
will allocate a strictly positive amount to ingroup extreme. For convenience, assume cA wins
the election. In this case, cA will set pl, pm such that the relative marginal utility of partisan










Both the RHS and LHS of Equation 11 are continuous in q, λ and pl. Moreover, for q > q∗, the
LHS is increasing in pl since E[xi|i ∈ A] is increasing in pl and E[xi|i ∈ B] is decreasing in pl,
which implies a unique crossing.
For ∂∆x/∂λ, note that the RHS of Equation 11 is increasing in λ while the LHS is constant.
Therefore, the equilibrium value of pl is increasing in λ, which implies that E[xi|i ∈ A]−E[xi|i ∈
B] is increasing in λ as well. Second, the case of ∂∆x/∂q is a bit more complex since both the
RHS and LHS of Equation 11 are functions of q. However, the result can be proved directly.
First, we introduce the following simplified notation: X = (λ(2q − 1)/(1− λ))m/(m−1).
Consider a discrete increase in q to q′ = q+∆q. We wish to show that E[xi|i ∈ A]′−E[xi|i ∈
B]′ > E[xi|i ∈ A]− E[xi|i ∈ B] or, equivalently, that ∆E[xi|i ∈ A] > ∆E[xi|i ∈ B]. Using this
notation and rearranging Equation 11, we get:
E[xi|i ∈ A]′ + (X + ∆X)E[xi|i ∈ B]′ = 0 = E[xi|i ∈ A] +XE[xi|i ∈ B].
And since X is increasing in q, which implies that ∆X > 0, we get:
E[xi|i ∈ A]′ +XE[xi|i ∈ B]′ > E[xi|i ∈ A] +XE[xi|i ∈ B].
Rearranging this equation gives:
∆E[xi|i ∈ A] +X∆E[xi|i ∈ B] > 0⇒ ∆E[xi|i ∈ A] > X∆E[xi|i ∈ B].
Note that since X > 1 this expression implies that ∆E[xi|i ∈ A] > ∆E[xi|i ∈ B], which proves
the result for a discrete change. Lastly, since all expressions are continuous in q, this result
holds as ∆q → 0.
For m = 1, the proof stems from the fact that with linear utility, candidates will either
allocate all policy to the center, or all policy to the partisan extreme. Too see this, note that by
Expression 9 the marginal relative return for allocating a unit of policy to the partisan extreme
is equal to:
(n/2− 1)[λ(q − 1/2)− 1/2(1− λ)],
which is positive if q > 1/(2λ). First, this shows that the threshold at which candidates switch
from allocating all policy to the center to allocating all policy to the partisan extreme, which
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results in an increase in ∆x, is decreasing in q and λ. Second, ∆x is increasing in q when all
policy is allocated to the partisan extreme, and constant when all policy is allocated to the
center. Together, these prove the result that ∆x is increasing in q and λ for m = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Lemma 2 shows that under the Benchmark model, both candidates will select pw = {0, 1, 0}.
Since both candidates select the same policy, voter i receives the following relative expected
utility for voting for the ingroup candidate:
p̄(αI − αi−),
which is positive iff 0 ≥ p̄∆α. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
Lemma 3 shows that under the Identity model, both candidates may select policies that favor
their partisan ingroup. Therefore, voter i receives the following relative expected utility for





] + αI − αi−
)
,
which is positive iff p̄∆x ≥ p̄∆α. 
Proof of Corollary 1:
(i) Follows directly from Proposition 2: Under the Benchmark model the candidates choose the
same policy for all q, which implies that voters have a constant incentive to vote for the ingroup
candidate.
(ii) In contrast to (i), Proposition 1 shows that the incentive to vote for the ingroup candidate
is increasing in q, since candidates choose more partisan policy for higher q.
(iii) Proposition 1 shows that when q = 0, there is no instrumental incentive to vote for the
ingroup candidate under the Identity model since ∆x = 0. 
B Suggestive evidence on the impact of higher social polariza-
tion
While our natural identity treatments seemingly do not implement a higher level of social
polarization than our minimal-group group treatment, we are able to report on an alternative
measure of social polarization. Namely, in the Dem vs Rep treatment in Florida, subjects
were also asked to self-report the strength of their party-identification in an post-experiment
questionnaire. We classify subjects into “strong partisans” and “weak partisans:” subjects
who answered that they are either “Strong Democrats” or “Strong Republicans” are classified
as strong partisans, while subjects who answered that they are “Independents”, “Not Strong
Democrats”, or “Not Strong Republicans” are classified as weak partisans (this question and
classification are standard in election studies). We find that 25% of our subjects self-report as
strong partisans.
This alternative measure of social polarization allows us to examine whether subjects who
self-report a stronger party identity exhibit a greater in-group bias as candidates, and a higher
degree of partisan voting as subjects. Our treatments were not explicitly designed to test
the impact of higher affect using within-session variation – thus, this ex-post analysis should
be considered as exploratory. However, since our natural identity treatments did not induce
a higher degree of social polarization (λ), this alternative metric for λ allows us to examine
whether the division between strong and weak partisans provides suggestive evidence to support
the comparative static predicted by Hypothesis 5.
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First, comparing the candidate choices of strong and weak partisans, we find essentially no
difference in the point estimate of the average in-group payoff bias, ∆x, from 1.40 (.92, 1.89)
for weak partisans to 1.41 (.68, 2.21) for strong partisans. For voters choices, however, we see
a large increase in the willingness to vote for the in-group candidate. Moreover, this increase
appears to be solely due to an increase in instrumental partisan voting: there is virtually no
difference in expressive partisan voting from strong and weak partisans when q = 0, but ∆̃α is
on average .57 (.11, 1.08) higher for strong partisans when q > 0. These data are displayed in
Figures B.1 and B.2.
Given that we find an increase in instrumental partisan voting for strong partisans, individ-
uals who self-report a stronger identification with the in-group identity may expect candidates
to display a higher degree of in-group bias.
Figure B.1: Difference in average token payoffs
from the allocations by in-group and out-group
candidates (∆x) by policy polarization (q) and
self-reported strength of party identification in












Figure B.2: Mean of maximum relative payoff
from the valence of the out-group candidate
(∆̃α) voters accept and still vote for the in-
group candidate by policy polarization (q) and
self-reported strength of party identification in
















We also find additional suggestive evidence regarding the impact of stronger social polariza-
tion from an additional treatment where subjects’ group identities were two-dimensional—one
exogenous, A vs B, and one endogenous, Bike vs Car. In this treatment, candidates allocated
policy in a five-point policy space consisting of a center point and an extreme point for each
two dimensional identity; e.g. a voter with identity A-Bike has an ideal at the upper-left with
probability q and an ideal point at the center with probability (1 − q) (see Figure B.3 for an
illustration of voters’ payoffs). We report on this treatment in detail in Section D.5.
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Figure B.3: Payoffs to each voter as a function of their ideal point, given that the winning
policy allocates one unit of policy at the upper-left extreme—with probability q voters have
ideal points at the extreme points corresponding to their two-dimensional identity.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, candidates display a higher bias towards voters with which
they share identities on both identity-dimensions, rather than equalizing payoff for all voters
with which they share a single identity (Figure B.4). Similarly, consistent with Hypothesis 5,
voters are significantly more likely to vote for candidates with which they share both identities
even when they have lower relative valence, and the rate of increase in partisan voting with q
is also higher for these candidates (Figure B.5).
While we did not intend for either of these alternatives to be our main test of Hypothesis 5,
given our inability to confirm or reject Hypothesis 5 in our main treatments due to the lack of
an increase in social polarization with natural identities treatments, we find it relevant to report
this suggestive evidence on the impact of increased social polarization on partisan voting.
Figure B.4: Average token payoff from candi-
date allocation (∆x) by policy polarization (q)
and target of allocation in the multi-identity
















Figure B.5: Partisan voting by policy polariza-
tion (q) and target of the partisan vote in the
multi-identity treatment: exact identity, A or
























C.1 Decision environment by round
The placeholder in the table, e.g. the probabilities “1” to “5” in column 4 were filled with the
different values of assigned policy polarization (q), that is either 0, .25, .5, .75, or 1. The random
order of assignment of q (without replacement) varies by subject.
Table C.1: Sequence of choices by subjects in the role of voters and candidates in the voting
game. Policy polarization q (0, .25, .5, .75, .1) is randomly assigned to each subject by block of
9 rounds each
Round Voters Candidates q-Probability Block
1 Vote 1 Allocation 1
1
2 Vote 2 –
...
... –
9 Vote 9 –
10 Vote 10 Allocation 2
2
11 Vote 11 –
...
... –
18 Vote 18 –
19 Vote 19 Allocation 3
3
20 Vote 20 –
...
... –
27 Vote 27 –
28 Vote 28 Allocation 4
4
29 Vote 29 –
...
... –
36 Vote 36 –
37 Vote 37 Allocation 5
5
38 Vote 36 –
...
... –
45 Vote 45 –
C.2 Instructions: A vs B treatment
Introduction
In this experiment you will make a series of choices. At the end of the experiment, you will be
paid according to your choices and the choices of other participants. Pay close attention to the
instructions because each of your decisions potentially affects your payoff from this experiment.
This experiment has two parts. Your total earnings will consist of a show-up fee of 7 Dollars and
your earnings from each of the two parts of the experiment. During the course of the experiment
you will earn tokens, which will be exchanged into Dollars at the end of the experiment at a
rate of
1 Token = 60 Cent.
We will start with a brief instruction period and Part 1 of the experiment. You will then receive
instructions for Part 2 of the experiment and finish that part accordingly. Should you have
questions while I read out these instructions, please raise your hand and after I have finished
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reading the instructions, I will come and assist you. Should you have questions during the
experiment, please raise your hand at any time.
Part 1
In part 1 of the experiment, you will make 50 decisions: 45 in the role of a Voter and 5 in
the role of a Candidate.
Assignment to Group A and Group B
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to either Group A or Group
B. You will remain a member of this group until the end of the experiment; that is, until you
have made all 50 decisions.
Decisions as Voter
As a voter you will make 45 decisions. In each decision, you will be asked whether you prefer
Candidate A, who is a member of Group A, or Candidate B, who is a member of
Group B.
While you are making your decisions, you will see the following information on the screen:
1. The level of Ability of Candidate A and Candidate B;
2. The probability with which your Position is either Left, Center, or Right.
The level of ability of Candidate A and Candidate B is either Low, Average, or, High.
Importantly, if you are assigned to Group A, your position can only be Left or Center and if
you are assigned to Group B, it can only be Center or Right.
Additionally, when you are assigned to Group A, the probability that your Position is Left, and
not Center, in the voter decisions is either 100%, 75%, 50%, 25% or 0%. When you are assigned
to Group B, the probability that your Position is Right, and not Center, in the voter decisions
is either 100%, 75%, 50%, 25% or 0%.
To assist you, you will see those probabilities on your screen while you make your decision.
Decisions as Candidate
As a Candidate you will make 5 decisions. In each decision, you will be ask how you want to
allocate up to 10 Tokens to the positions Left, Center, or Right. You may allocate all
10 Tokens to one position, allocate them in any way over two or three positions, allocate less
than 10 Tokens, or do not allocate tokens at all.
While you are making your decisions as a Candidate, you will see on the screen the probabil-
ities with which the Voters are distributed over the three positions Left, Center,
and Right.
That is, for each candidate decision, you will learn whether the Voters in Group A are al-
ways on Position Left (100%) and never on Center (0%), mostly Left (75%) and rarely Center
(25%), equally likely Left (50%) and Center (50%), rarely Left (25%) and mostly Center (75%),
or never Left (0%) and always Center (100%). You will receive similar information about the
probability distribution of Voters in Group B, differing only in the fact that those Voters are
either on Position Right or Position Center.
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To illustrate the distribution of probabilities of Voters in each decision, you will see them on
your screen while making your decisions as a Candidate.
Earnings in part 1 of the experiment
After you have made 45 decisions as a Voter and 5 decisions as a Candidate, your earnings will
be calculated as follows:
1. One participant in Group A and one participant in Group B is randomly selected as
Candidate A and Candidate B.
2. One of the distribution of probabilities of the Voters Positions is randomly chosen – every
distribution is equally likely to be picked.
3. Either a low, average, or high ability is randomly assigned to the two participants who
are selected as candidates – each level of ability is equally likely to be picked.
4. The choices of voters in the decision situation that corresponds to the randomly chosen
levels of ability of the two candidates, and the randomly picked distribution of probabilities
of the Voters Positions, is used to determine whether Candidate A or Candidate B has
won the election.
5. The candidate who received a majority of votes of the participants who were not picked
to be the candidates is the Winner of the Election; should both candidates receive the
same number of votes, a fair coin is tossed to determine the winner.
6. The assigned ability and the allocation of tokens of the Winner of the Election now
serves as basis for the earnings of the remaining participants. The two participants who
were selected to be the candidates are paid according to the outcome of the election.
Should you be picked to be one of the Candidates for the purpose of determining earnings, your
earnings will be
15 Tokens
if you are the Winner of the Election, but only
5 Tokens
if you are not the Winner of the Election.
If you are picked to be one of the Voters for the purpose of determining earnings, your earnings
will be
As a Voter in Position Left:
Income based on the ability of the Winner of the Election + Tokens Left +
(Tokens Center)/2
As a Voter in Position Center:
Income based on the ability of the Winner of the Election + Tokens Center +
(Tokens Left + Tokens Right)/2
As a Voter in Position Right:
Income based on the ability of the Winner of the Election + Tokens Right +
(Tokens Center)/2
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The Income based on the ability of the Winner of the Election is 5 Tokens when the
assigned ability is High, is 3 Tokens when the ability is Average, and is 2 Tokens when the
ability is Low.
Here is an example of how your earnings are calculated. After all participants have made all of
their decisions, two participants, one from Group A and one from Group B, are randomly chosen
to be Candidate A and Candidate B, respectively. Now, suppose Candidate A from Group A
is randomly assigned a low ability and Candidate B from Group B is randomly assigned a
high ability. Further, suppose the randomly chosen probability distribution specifies that the
Position of Voters in Group A is Left with a probability of 75% and Center with a probability of
25%, and that the Position of Voters in Group B is Right with a probability of 75% and Center
with a probability of 25%.
Additionally, assume that in the decision situation with this probability distribution, a Can-
didate A with low ability, and a Candidate B with high ability, a majority of Voters prefer
Candidate B. Further suppose that the participant chosen to be Candidate B allocated 7 To-
kens to Position Left, 2 to Position Center, and 1 to Position Right. In this way, the participant
who was chosen to be Candidate B receives 15 Tokens as Winner of the Election, and the par-
ticipant who was chosen to be Candidate A receives 5 Tokens for losing the election. Moreover,
of the remaining participants, those chosen to be Voters in Position Left receive 5 + 7 + 2/2
= 13 Tokens, in Position Center receive 5 + 2 + (7 + 1)/2 = 11 Tokens, and in Position Right
receive 5 + 1 + 2/2 = 7 Tokens.
You will receive instructions for part 2 on your screen at the beginning of that part.
Again, your total earnings in this experiment will consist of a show-up fee of 7 Dollars and your
earnings in part 1 and part 2 of the experiment.
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C.3 Screen shots of subjects decisions screens in the A vs B treatment
Figure C.1: Voter decision screen
Figure C.2: Candidate decision screen
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C.4 Assessing the pivotality assumption
Figure C.3: Distribution of vote margins by identity treatment.
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep

















Figure C.4: Vote margin plotted over policy polarization (q) by identity treatment. Blue line










































































































































































































































A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep



































































































































































































































































































































































Table D.1: Session statistics
Treatment
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep
Session 1 2 3 1 2 1 2
Number of subjects 24 24 26 24 24 24 24
A 12 12 13






of voters 1080 1080 1170 1080 1080 1080 1080
of candidates 120 120 130 120 120 120 120
Average earnings (in Euro) 13.9 12.9 13.4 14.5 12.9 13.3 14.3
D.2 Summary statistics
Table D.2: Summary statistics
Variable A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep
Share of subjects in A .50 (.50)
Share of subjects in Bike .52 (.50)
Share of subjects in Dem .69 (.46)
voting decision
vote for A over B .52 (.50)
vote for Bike over Car .55 (.50)
vote for Dem vs Rep .61 (.49)
∆̃α
Overall .41 (.92) .78 (.79) .86 (.82)
at q = 0 .54 (.95) .71 (.77) .60 (.76)
.25 .73 (.88) .73 (.68) .73 (.82)
.50 .84 (.92) .79 (.85) .98 (.89)
.75 1.00 (.86) .81 (.89) 1.00 (.80)
1 1.18 (.87) .83 (.75) 1.00 (.77)
allocation decision
Left 2.84 (2.87) 2.89 (2.91) 3.65 (2.87)
Center 4.33 (3.24) 4.40 (3.25) 4.01 (2.92)
Right 2.68 (2.67) 2.67 (3.10) 2.05 (2.02)
∆x
Overall 1.86 (3.06) 2.21 (3.20) 1.62 (2.67)
at q = 0 0 0 0
.25 .34 (.57) .55 (.57) .56 (.75)
.50 1.37 (1.45) 1.59 (1.61) 1.10 (1.59)
.75 2.69 (2.89) 3.30 (3.00) 2.53 (2.83)
1 4.92 (4.50) 5.62 (4.35) 3.90 (3.87)
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D.3 Candidate policy choices
Figure D.1: Distribution of difference in token payoffs from the allocations by in-group and
out-group candidates (∆x) for A vs B, Bike vs Car, and Dem vs Rep treatments.
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep

















Figure D.2: Average token payoff from the allocations by in-group and out-group candidates
(Difference in average token payoffs from the allocations by in-group and out-group candidates
is ∆x) plotted over policy polarization (q) by identity treatment.
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep



























D.4 Voter election decisions
Figure D.3: Distribution of the maximum relative payoff from the ability of the out-group
candidate (∆̃α) by identity treatment.
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep

















Figure D.4: Mean of the maximum relative payoff from the ability of the out-group candidate
(∆̃α) voters accept to vote for the in-group candidate plotted over policy polarization (q) by
identity treatment.
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep













Figure D.5: Distribution of voters’ minimum relative payoff from the ability of the out-group
candidate (min(∆̃α)) by identity treatment.
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep

















Figure D.6: Mean of the minimum relative payoff from the ability of the out-group candidate
(min(∆̃α)) voters accept to vote for the out-group candidate plotted over policy polarization
(q) by identity treatment.
A vs B Bike vs Car Dem vs Rep














Our finding of instrumental motivations for group identity-driven behavior may be undermined
by the weakness of identities induced in the laboratory: for any expressive motivation to surface,
a stronger, more contextualized identity may be needed. We implement the Bike vs Car-, Dem vs
Rep-, and multi-identity-treatments exactly for the purpose of inducing, even if only marginally,
stronger identities. Partisan voting and partisan allocation emerges as well, as expected, when
inducing stronger identities but we do not see a large increase in the strength of these in-group
biases in vote choices and allocation decisions.
A more valid test of whether subjects attach higher salience to a stronger identity may be
to put two dimensions of group identities that supposedly differ in their strength side-by-side
and let subjects choose which one they emphasis in their decision-making. We do so by letting
subjects decide whether they want to put more emphasis on the distinction A vs B or Bike vs
Car, as we chose to implement in our multi-identity treatment. In this treatment, subjects are
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characterized by a compound identity: A-Bike, B-Bike, A-Car, or B-Car. We find, first, while
partisan voting for candidates who share the exact identity with the voter is larger than the one
for those who share the A/B- or Bike/Car-identity, in-group allocations are smallest for this
candidate. Second, and more importantly, there is, again, a (weak) increase in partisan voting
and in partisan allocations with increasing policy preference polarization.
In this multi-identity treatment, voters are labelled A-Bike-, B-Bike-, A-Car-, or B-Car-
voters according to their group assignment. Assignment to Bike or Car takes place before
subjects learn the content of the voting game and assignment to A or B occurs after subjects
received instructions for the voting game but before the voting game commences. Candidates
are asked to allocate up to 16 tokens to the five positions of a preference space: four positions
in the extreme corners, Left-Up, Right-Up, Right-Down, or Left-Down, and one position at the
Center. Voters decide whether to vote for one of two candidates in two possible pairings of
candidates: A-Bike vs B-Car or A-Car vs B-Bike. The probability with which voters are at the
extreme of the preference space, that is the degree of policy polarization q, is either .25 or .75.
Voters are, again, also told the ability and group membership of both of the candidates. The
decision environment is described not only by q but also by which pairing of candidates they
can choose from: A-Bike vs B-Car or A-Car vs B-Bike. q is fixed for 18 rounds while the pairing
of candidate is the same for 9 rounds (while the level of ability varies over those 9 rounds). For
payoffs, a decision situation is picked at random: it is represented by a realisation of q, candidate
abilities, and a candidate pairing. If assigned an extreme ideal point, voters receive 1 token for
each 1 token allocated to the extreme of the preference space associated with the group of the
voter and .5 token for each 1 token allocated to a position in the preference space contiguous to
the extreme associated with their group. If assigned an ideal point in the center, voters receive
1 token for each 1 token allocated to the center and .5 token for each 1 token allocated to any
of the extreme positions in the preference space. For example, when assigned an extreme ideal
point an A-Bike-voter receives 1 token from each 1 token allocated to Left-Up and .5 token from
each 1 token allocated to Left-Down, Right-Up, and Center. Similarly, A-Car-, B-Bike-, and
B-Car-voters with such an extreme ideal point receive a full 1 token from each 1 token allocated
to their extreme corner but only .5 token from each 1 token allocated to the corners contiguous
to theirs and to the Center. Note, in the multi-identity treatment, social efficiency is maximized
by allocating all tokens to the center. This is most clearly illustrated in the extreme case of
q = 1. In this case, a token allocated to an extreme point gives a total payoff of 2 tokens (1 to
the individuals at the extreme point and 1/2 to each adjacent extreme), while a token allocated
to the center gives a total payoff of 2 (1/2 to all individuals).
In 2 sessions with 24 subjects each, we collect, for each subject, 36 observations as voter and
4 observations as candidate. In total, we collect 1728 voter-round observations in the multi-
identity treatment. The total number of candidate-round observations is 192. The average
earnings in Euro were 18 and 16.6 in the two sessions, respectively.25 The group identity
inducement procedure generated 17 subjects in group A/Bike, 7 in A/Car, 16 in B/Bike, and
10 in B/Car. That is half of the subjects were assigned to Group A and 65% to group Bike.
The vote share of the A-Bike over the B-Car candidate was .55 (.50) and of the A-Car
candidate over the B-Bike candidate was .41 (.49). Subjects allocated, on average, 2.76 (2.87)
tokens to the Left-Up corner, 2.21 (2.49) to Right-Up, 5.31 (4.35) to the Center, 2.26 (2.42) to
Right-Down, and 2.51 (2.71) to Left-Down.
Figure D.7 and D.8 compare in-group voting for and in-group allocations of candidates who
25 In session 1 of this treatment, voters choices were not recorded correctly in the payment file. We therefore
paid the for subjects in the role of voters maximum possible earning of 16 tokens slightly increasing the average
payoff of that session relative to the other session of that treatment. Subjects only learned at the moment
of payout that this error occurred, in this way, their choices throughout the experiments could not have been
affected.
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share the exact identity of the voter, those who share their A/B-identity, and those who share
their Bike/Car-identity. First, while partisan voting for candidates who share the exact identity
with the voter is larger than the one for those who share the A/B- or Bike/Car-identity, in-group
allocations are smallest for this candidate.
Figure D.7: Rate of partisan voting by pol-
icy preference polarization and type of shared
identity – exact, A/B, or Bike/Car-identity –
for negative ability difference between in- and
out-group candidate


















A/B Bike/Car Exact ID
Figure D.8: Rate of allocation to extreme
and center by policy preference polarization
and type of shared identity – exact, A/B, or
Bike/Car-identity













































A/B Bike/Car Exact ID
Second, and more importantly, there is, again, a (weak) increase in partisan voting and
in partisan allocations with increasing policy preference polarization. The change in partisan
voting, however, is not significantly different from zero, i.e., the marginal effect of raising the
level of policy preference polarization from .25 to .75 heightens the rate of voting for the in-
group candidate who exactly matches the voters identity by .03 % (-.03,.08). In contrast, more
polarization in policy preferences systematically increase allocations to all types of in-group
voters, i.e., those who share an exact, A/B, or Bike/Car-identity with the candidate. A change
in polarization from .25 to .75 raises in-group allocations by 2.53 (1.66,3.41) of the candidates
who share the exact identity, 3.11 (2.21,4.00) of those who share the A/B-identity, and by 3.33
(2.38,4.28) tokens of those who share the Bike/Car-identity. More polarization also decreases
allocation to the center by 4.43 (3.29,5.57) tokens.
D.6 Subject-level analysis
We now turn to the question whether the observed patterns are robust to subject-level het-
erogeneity. In other words, are results driven by a small subset of subjects or do we observe
a general tendency in behavior. We find, in the aggregate, that in-group favoring allocation
decisions by candidates (∆x) and partisan voting (∆̃α) is increasing in the level of policy po-
larization q. To characterize subjects-level behavior, we investigate whether the distribution
of individual-level choices follows the overall patterns of ∆x and ∆̃α in its relationship to q
narrowly. We find that it mostly does with respect to candidate allocations but the variation
of partisan voting around the treatment mean is less narrow. Here subject-level heterogeneity
arises but our overall results are still robust to modeling subject-level idiosyncrasies and can be
traced to subjects best responding to their own allocation decisions.
More specifically, in a subject-level regression of ∆x on q we estimate a significantly positive
relationship for 41% and a positive relationship for 41% of subjects. (Recall we collected 5
allocation decisions for each subject, one for each level of policy polarization.) The coefficient
estimate on q is negative and not significant for the remaining 18% of the sample, only.
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We clearly find more subject-level heterogeneity in the relationship between ∆̃α and q.
While we estimate a positive subject-level slope in the relationship ∆̃α and q for 70% of subjects,
only 14% of the coefficient estimates associated with q are significant. On the other hand, of
the estimated negative coefficients for the remaining 30%, the subject-level regression of ∆̃α on
q returns a significantly negative coefficient estimate on q for only 1% of subjects. (Recall we
collected 45 voting decisions for each subject, one for each combination of candidate ability pair
and level of policy polarization.)
At this point, it is relevant to ask what drives subject-level heterogeneity in the relationship
between partisan voting and policy polarization. A reasonable place to start that investigation
is the question whether ∆̃α varies because of variation in subjects’ beliefs about candidate
allocations. A good approximation of what voters believe about candidates’ behavior is how
they themselves chose to allocate. 30-40% of subjects always vote for an in-group (out-group)
candidate whenever ability difference and their own allocations would give them higher utility
than voting for the out-group (in-group) candidate. About 90% of subjects best respond in at
least 2/3 of their choices. This is indicated by the dominance of the light gray area.
Further, these subject-specific best responses are stable across policy polarization and there-
fore do not bias the overall trend of ∆̃α increasing in q. Figure D.9 shows that the profile of
strategies within-subject does not change with increasing policy polarization q. For the bulk of
subjects, increasing q by .25 increases the share of any of the strategies by less than .01.
Figure D.9: Distribution of estimated change in share of subject choice type (best responding to
own allocations, should vote for in-group but votes for out-group, should vote for out-group but
votes for in-group) when policy polarization q increases. The reported statistic is the coefficient
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